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MAKING DEBT PAY: EXAMINING THE USE OF PROPERTY
TAX DELINQUENCY AS A REVENUE SOURCE
ABSTRACT
In tough economic times, everyone looks for ways to do more with less.
Local governments, however, face the challenge of doing more with money
they do not have. With the recent shrinking of their budgets, it is critical that
governments use their limited funding and opportunities for future funding
wisely. One such opportunity for future revenue, the payment of delinquent
property tax obligations, is critical to providing basic public services, such as
education and emergency services. However, government officials may not be
maximizing this resource and there is a risk that governments’ financial needs
are being exploited.
In an effort to generate revenue and overcome budgetary shortfalls, many
local governments sell the right to collect delinquent taxes, along with interest
and penalties applied to the amount owed, through the sale of property tax
liens. The liens are sold, often for less than the amount of total debt, to private
investors who are able to use the government’s enforcement tools—including
property foreclosure—to collect the debt owed. Although this $20 billion
market generates short-term funds, it obscures the amount of revenue that is
forgone in exchange.
This Comment examines the strategies available for managing delinquent
tax digests in search of a method that maximizes the return received by local
governments while preserving political accountability, protecting consumers,
and minimizing aggregate social costs. It analyzes the risks posed by tax lien
sales to these objectives and suggests that delinquent tax anticipation notes
and contracted lien servicing, or a combination of the two alternatives, best
enable governments to maximize revenue, meet policy objectives, and serve
taxpayer interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Both borrower and creditor benefit from a loan. However, what results is
not necessarily an even exchange. The creditor has some degree of power
because the borrower has a need. In some circumstances, the interest rate that a
borrower pays on the principal received is greater if there is a need that the
lender can exploit. Title lending and payday lending, for example, are
financing schemes of last resort that convert assets or future receivables to cash
in exchange for high interest rates or fees.1 Although these high borrowing
costs reflect a substantial risk of nonpayment by the debtor,2 they also take
advantage of the financial hardships of borrowers who lack the financial
stability needed to obtain lower interest loans.3
Local governments often find themselves borrowers due to property tax
delinquencies. Property tax revenues are critical for providing services such as
education and police protection,4 and delinquent payments of tax obligations
can create budgetary shortfalls that threaten the provision of those services.
Government officials are then faced with deciding whether to cut or modify
services, generate additional revenue, or borrow money. None of these
solutions comes without a tradeoff: cutting services can be politically
infeasible, finding a new revenue source is difficult, and increasing the amount
of debt creates an additional cost because of the loan’s interest. After weighing
these options, many local governments elect to generate revenue through the
sale of future receivables—property tax liens.5 The decision has evolved into a
$20 billion market.6

1 See Michelle Hodson, Serena Owens & Steve Fritts, Payday Lending, An Update on Emerging Issues
in Banking, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Jan. 29, 2003), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/012903fyi.
html.
2 See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 720–21 (2006) (describing lenders’ use of borrowers’ risk to derive
interest rates); Hodson et al., supra note 1 (stating that payday borrowers “have cash flow difficulties and few,
if any, lower-cost borrowing alternatives”).
3 See Hodson et al., supra note 1.
4 See JEFFREY L. BARNETT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
SUMMARY: 2009, at 4 (2011) (describing how local government expenditures made up nearly 87% of state and
local government spending on police protection expenditures while education represents 37% of all local
government spending). The property tax accounts for nearly three-quarters of all tax revenue received by local
governments. See id. at 3.
5 See infra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
6 See Robert A. Jarrow & Vikrant Tyagi, Tax Liens: A Novel Application of Asset Pricing Theory, 10
REV. DERIVATIVES RES. 181, 181 (2007).
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The sale of property tax liens produces needed revenue, but it is unclear if
this strategy produces the best outcomes for taxpayers. When a government
sells property tax liens, it incurs an opportunity cost of forgone future tax
collections.7 This cost is potentially higher than the cost of other financing
options—for example, issuing bonds that allow governments to borrow at lowinterest rates8—because it transfers to the purchaser all of the potential
earnings from tax liens. In addition, the sales create negative externalities
because they transfer control of tax foreclosure processes from the government
to private parties.9 Finally, tax lien sales impede transparency and political
accountability and may trigger constitutional due process and consumer
protection concerns.10
This Comment advocates using a more transparent and more cost-effective,
revenue-generating strategy, and argues that using tax lien sales masks the true
costs borne by governments, taxpayers, and consumers. Part I provides an
overview of how the property tax and its enforcement affect local government
finance. It first describes the statutory tools for tax enforcement, including the
attachment of property tax liens to tax delinquent property, then discusses the
options available for servicing delinquent property tax digests, and finally
provides a detailed discussion of the methods that governments use to sell
property tax liens.
Part II compares the effects of tax lien sales to the effects of other strategies
for managing a delinquent property tax digest and explores what exactly a
local government exchanges for the revenue it receives. It analyzes risks
associated with tax lien sales, including negative externalities, lower economic
rates of return, diminished political accountability, and constitutional and
consumer protection concerns.
Part III asserts that governments should select a servicing strategy that
maximizes their returns and enables control over social costs. It advocates for

7 Tax lien sales transfer the right to use remedies available to governments to the purchaser, such as
levying interest and penalties. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-195h (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19(b)(1)
(West 2011). See generally Part II.B.
8 Compare CMTY. CAPITAL MGMT., A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: TAXABLE MUNICIPAL BONDS AND
CORPORATE BONDS 6 (2010) (describing rates no higher than 6.5%), with infra note 33 and accompanying text
(describing how tax liens can accrue 18% interest), and ALLAN LUNDELL, OHIO LEGISLATIVE BUDGET OFFICE,
FISCAL NOTE & LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT H.B. 371, at 2 (1997) (describing how governments forgo the
collection of interest and penalties assessed to delinquent tax obligations).
9 See infra Part II.A.
10 See infra Part II.C–D.
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two solutions to help mitigate the risks addressed in Part II. First, it proposes
using short-term municipal financing secured by the tax liens, which treats the
delinquent taxes as creating a receivable asset that can be used to secure
financing. It argues that a combined strategy of government servicing and
delinquent tax anticipation notes offers the most political accountability,
financial transparency, and government control over externalities. Second, it
recognizes that private servicing of delinquent tax digests may be necessary in
jurisdictions that lack capacity to service them, and advocates for using
contracted servicing or consolidated government servicing in those
jurisdictions.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROPERTY TAX AND REVENUE RECOVERY
Nearly 40,000 municipalities have jurisdiction over local taxation, services,
and debt financing.11 States grant municipalities these powers by exercising
their Tenth Amendment power to govern;12 therefore, the municipalities are
limited to operating under authority granted through state constitutions and
state statutes.13 Under this authority, they levy, collect, and enforce ad valorem
taxes, which can include both real and personal property taxes based on a rate
applied to a property valuation.14
Property tax revenues15 are vital to the operation of local governments.
Nationally, the revenues comprise nearly three-quarters of local government
tax revenue (approximately 73.9%) and more than one-third (approximately
39.5%) of all local government revenue sources.16 They provide a substantial
proportion of funds used to finance key services such as education, public
safety, and public health.17 In 2009, local government spending on public
safety represented approximately 87% of total state and local government
11

See J OHN L. M IKESELL, FISCAL ADMINISTRATION 29–30 (Carolyn Merrill et al. eds., 8th ed. 2011).
U.S. CONST. amend. X; MIKESELL, supra note 11, at 31–32.
13 M IKESELL, supra note 11, at 32. For example, some local governments have “home-rule charter”
authority to operate in any manner that does not conflict with state law. Id.; e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-35-3(a)
(West 2003).
14 J ONATHAN G RUBER , P UBLIC FINANCE AND P UBLIC P OLICY 650 (Craig Bleyer et al. eds., 2005);
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-3 (West 2009); see also Byron F. Lutz, The Connection Between House Price
Appreciation and Property Tax Revenues, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 555, 557 (2008).
15 This Comment addresses ad valorem taxation of real property, which comprises the majority of
property tax collections, rather than ad valorem taxation of personal property, which provides a negligible
revenue source. See Lutz, supra note 14, at 557.
16 BARNETT, supra note 4, at 3.
17 See id. at 3–4. Local government funds also substantially contribute to total government expenditures
for highways, hospitals, and parks. Id. at 7.
12
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expenditures for police protection.18 Local governments alone finance fire
protection.19
Because of this reliance on property taxes, nonpayment or delayed payment
of tax obligations can impede provision of government services.20 The effect is
most severe in periods of declining economic activity when tax revenues
generally decline while need for government services, such as public safety,
grows.21 This effect is compounded by the generally lean budgets of local
governments,22 which make revenue gaps difficult to overcome. As a result,
tax delinquency can affect a local government’s overall fiscal health. The slim
margin for error in budgeting has led to recent bankruptcy filings of local
governments, including the largest Chapter 9 bankruptcy in the country’s
history in Jefferson County, Alabama.23 Finally, tax delinquency creates
revenue uncertainty, which makes budgeting difficult and inaccurate.24
The importance of property tax revenues in public finance heightens the
need to enforce the tax, and state statutes provide local governments with
authority to do so.25 Despite the incentive for compliance that this enforcement
authority creates, a portion of tax obligations remains unpaid, estimated at
more than $7 billion annually.26 Government officials, then, must select a
strategy to overcome revenue shortages: cut funding for services, improve tax
collection effectiveness, or find additional revenue sources. After weighing
these options, many governments elect to generate revenue through the sale of
future receivables—property tax liens.27 This Part describes how state law
establishes local governments’ enforcement authority by creating property tax
liens and creates incentives to sell tax liens. It also details how tax lien sales
are used to service a government’s delinquent tax digest and generate

18

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4, 7.
20 See PAUL T. GRAZIANO ET AL., HOUS. AUTH. OF BALT. CITY, A PLAN TO CREATE THE BALTIMORE CITY
LAND BANK app. 2, at 8 (2007).
21 See ALAN MALLACH, BROOKINGS INST., TACKLING THE MORTGAGE CRISIS: 10 ACTION STEPS FOR
STATE GOVERNMENT 6–7 (2008); Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1965, 1971 (2011).
22 PAUL T. GRAZIANO ET AL., supra note 20, app. 2, at 8.
23 Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Distressed Cities Weigh Bold Tactics in a New Fiscal Era,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at A19; Mary Williams Walsh, Bankruptcy Filing Raises Doubts About a Bond
Repayment Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2011, at B1.
24 PAUL T. GRAZIANO ET AL., supra note 20, app. 2, at 8.
25 See infra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
26 Jarrow & Tyagi, supra note 6, at 184.
27 See infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
19
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additional revenue and describes other servicing strategies that local
governments use.
A. Delinquency Deterrence and Tax Enforcement Authority
Property tax liens enable tax enforcement. They are statutorily created,
attach to the underlying property, and establish a debt to the local government
that is secured by the property.28 The debt has “super-priority” status, which
permits governments to collect it before other creditors can collect debts
secured by the same property—including mortgage liens and federal income
tax liens.29
Once the liens attach, state statutes equip local governments with a range of
enforcement procedures, such as financial penalties and tax foreclosure sales of
properties attached to tax liens.30 These types of remedies are common
nationally, but different jurisdictions use a variety of procedures and time
limits.31 Financial consequences to delinquency compensate the government
for the delayed receipt of taxes and may deter lengthy delinquency. A property
tax lien can accrue monthly interest and can incur monthly or annual penalties
based on a percentage of the lien’s face value.32 Annual interest rates can reach
at least 18% in many jurisdictions33 and combined interest and penalties can
near or exceed 30% annually.34 These high-interest rates and penalties can

28 See Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 770 (2000). Property
tax liens can attach on the date taxes are due or before taxes are due. Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 42-17153, -18052 (2006), with MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP. § 14-804 (West 2002).
29 A federal statute permits states to set the priority of property tax liens above that of all federal income
tax liens, even those that arose earlier in time. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(6) (2006). In each state, property tax liens have
priority over all or most other liens. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 197.122(1) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP.
§ 14-805(a) (West 2002); see also Alexander, supra note 28, at 770–72.
30 See infra notes 32–34, 36–37 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-146 (2011); IOWA CODE § 445.39 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 60, § 62 (West 2009). Some jurisdictions establish the remedies by local procedure only and thus tax
enforcement can vary significantly even within the same state. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-35-3 (West
2003).
32 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-146 (2011) (18% annual interest); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/21-15
(2011) (1.5% monthly interest).
33 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-146 (2011) (18% annual interest); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/21-15 (2011)
(1.5% monthly interest); IOWA CODE §§ 445.39, 447.1 (2011) (1.5% monthly interest that can increase to 2%);
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 140.100(1), .340(1) (2011) (up to 10% annual interest and 18% annual penalty). A 1.5%
monthly rate is equivalent to a 19.56% annual rate if compounded.
34 Annual interest and penalties can total 35% in Alaska and 28% in California, Missouri, and
Washington, D.C. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 29.45.250(a) (West 2007); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 2617–18,
4103(a) (West 1998); D.C. CODE § 47-811(c) (2005); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 140.100(1), .340(1) (2011).
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quickly raise a lien’s value to a substantial proportion of the underlying
property’s value.
Once a lien is established, a property owner can extinguish it by paying the
taxes owed plus any interest or penalties.35 However, if a property owner
remains delinquent for an extended period, local governments may foreclose
upon the tax lien and compel a transfer of the underlying property so that they
can recover the debt.36 The proceeds from this “tax sale” are used to extinguish
the lien and can be used to provide government services.37
However, before tax sales occur, the tax foreclosure process is often
lengthy and can take as long as four to six years to implement.38 The time
needed to complete a tax foreclosure is influenced by the degree of judicial
involvement,39 the ability to initiate foreclosure proceedings in bulk,40 and the
length and timing of a “redemption period” during which a property owner can
redeem a property either before or after it is sold through tax foreclosure.41 A
tax sale occurs in one of three scenarios: a pre-foreclosure redemption period
and a single foreclosure process; a post-sale redemption period and a single
foreclosure process; or two foreclosure processes, one before the tax sale of a
property and one after expiration of the redemption period.42

35

Alexander, supra note 28, at 774–75.
E.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP. § 14-820 (West 2002); id. § 14-833 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010),
amended by Act of May 2, 2012, ch. 188, 2012 Md. Laws 1.
37 See id. §§ 14-820, -833.
38 Frank S. Alexander & Leslie A. Powell, Neighborhood Stabilization Strategies for Vacant and
Abandoned Properties, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Sept. 2011, at 1, 5; see OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, AUDIT
OF PHILADELPHIA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND THE PHILADELPHIA AUTHORITY FOR
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 27 (2000) (stating that the foreclosure process is “expensive and time-consuming”
and thus serves better as a threat than as a collection procedure). But see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-1006(1)
(West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361.570(1)–(3) (West 2011) (transferring property to the creditor
automatically on a set date).
39 Judicial involvement also slows the speed of property disposal and increases transaction costs; in
contrast, non-judicial foreclosure is faster and has lower costs. Georgette C. Poindexter et al., Selling
Municipal Property Tax Receivables: Economics, Privatization, and Public Policy in an Era of Urban
Distress, 30 CONN. L. REV. 157, 181 (1997).
40 E.g., FLA. STAT § 197.502(9) (2012); see also Alexander & Powell, supra note 38, at 5.
41 See Alexander, supra note 28, at 775; Alexander & Powell, supra note 38, at 4 (describing the
differing time frames for property redemption and the process differences affecting timing).
42 Alexander, supra note 28, at 779–80.
36
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B. The Divergent Effects of Tax Foreclosure
Tax foreclosures have widely varying effects as sources of revenue and
community improvement, which differ based on the property, the foreclosure
process, and the tax sale purchaser. In some cases, a delinquent property does
not generate additional government revenue. First, the property may not be
subject to tax foreclosure. Some governments may elect to approve payment
plans or mitigate property tax burdens on disadvantaged groups, such as
elderly or disabled persons.43 Some governments also have authority to reduce
the debt attached to a certain property to allow transfer and rehabilitation.44
Second, some properties that are foreclosed upon may not generate a high
enough price to recover the aggregate tax-related indebtedness secured by the
tax lien on the property. Properties that have a market value lower than the lien
face value will not sell for the full face value. Further, some jurisdictions only
permit the sale of properties for the full face value of the lien and do not permit
partial recovery.45 These types of properties can remain vacant for years.46
Finally, some of the properties that are ultimately sold in a tax sale can
create future problems in the community if they are sold to a certain type of
new owner. Tax sale purchasers can be parties who will pay taxes on and
maintain or rehabilitate the property, such as “prospective homeowners,
adjacent owners, and developers.”47 However, they also may be “over
enthusiastic investors” who plan to resell or rent property at unrealistic profits
or “speculators” who seek to take as much value as possible from property.48
Properties purchased by such parties can experience a cycle of tax foreclosure

43

E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-124a(a), -129n(a) (2011) (permitting relief to homeowners aged sixtyfive or older, permanently and totally disabled, or assessed taxes exceeding 8% of income); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:5-65 (West 2002) (permitting entry into a payment plan with property owner).
44 DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (allowing county councils to give tax exemptions for property if it “will best
promote the public welfare”); MD. CODE ANN., TAX–PROP. § 14-806 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005) (allowing
municipality to release liens of vacant and abandoned properties to facilitate transfer).
45 E.g., A RIZ. R EV . S TAT . A NN . § 42-18104(B) (2006); G A. C ODE A NN . § 48-3-19(b)(1) (West 2011).
46 Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, The Impact of Vacant, Tax-Delinquent and Foreclosed
Property on Sales Prices of Neighboring Homes 4 & n.3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper No.
11-23, 2011).
47 Margaret Dewar, The Effects on Cities of “Best Practice” in Tax Foreclosure: Evidence from Detroit
and Flint 18–19 (Ctr. for Local, State, and Urban Policy, Univ. of Mich., Working Paper Series No. 2, 2009)
(describing a study of Michigan’s tax foreclosure sales).
48 Id.
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under multiple owners,49 be resold shortly after purchase,50 or even be sold
back to the initial owner.51
Conversely, tax foreclosures also can benefit a community. Foreclosures
enable the transfer of tax delinquent properties to tax compliant parties or
parties who will otherwise improve the property.52 Tax sale proceeds can result
in the recovery of part or all of the taxes owed.53 If used consistently and fairly,
tax foreclosures also can create an incentive for property owners to pay their
taxes and can increase voluntary compliance with the property tax.54 This
incentive only exists, however, if property owners see foreclosure as a realistic
consequence of tax delinquency and have a desire to retain rights in their
property.55 For example, the inconsistent use of foreclosure by the city of
Philadelphia was cited as a factor in the city’s inability to collect enough taxes
to meet revenue needs.56 Poor enforcement of tax foreclosures can actually
increase a government’s administrative costs because more effort is required to
service a larger delinquent tax digest.57
Despite the threat of financial penalties and foreclosure, a portion of
property taxes remains unpaid58 and creates a delinquent tax digest that must
be serviced. Some government officials attribute large delinquent tax digests to
a lack of capacity to collect taxes.59 These digests are managed by cities in
several ways, which are described in the following section.

49

GRAZIANO ET AL., supra note 20, app. 2, at 4.
See id. (describing Baltimore properties cycling through tax foreclosure every two years); Dewar,
supra note 47, at 18 (stating that 23% of tax foreclosed homes in Flint, Michigan, and 17% in Detroit,
Michigan were sold again one year later).
51 E.g., Hamilton v. Royal Int’l Petroleum Corp., 934 So. 2d 25, 27, 29 (La. 2006) (involving a tax sale
purchase for less than $72 and an offer to re-sell it to the prior owner for about $2500).
52 See Dewar, supra note 47, at 18–19; see also supra text accompanying note 47.
53 See Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 161.
54 See id. at 160; Kevin T. Smith, An Update on Foreclosure of Real Property Tax Liens Under
Michigan’s New Tax Foreclosure Process, 36 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 30, 36 (2009) (describing how 85% of
liens (and therefore taxes) were ultimately paid before a property transfer to a new owner was finalized).
55 See Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, supra note 46, at 8 (“Property owners with no interest in retaining
ownership have no incentive to pay property taxes.”).
56 OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, supra note 38, at 23, 26, 27.
57 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1266 (2002) (describing how mortgage servicing costs are higher
when borrowers default because it “requires more constant vigilance”).
58 Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 160 (describing tax delinquency rates).
59 Id. (describing how city officials in Pittsburgh blamed “inadequate staff and resources devoted to
collecting taxes” for the city’s large number of property tax liens).
50
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C. Revenue Recovery Through Tax Lien Servicing Strategies
When a local government has a delinquent tax digest, it can provide
collection and enforcement services or pay another party to provide the
services. The sale of tax liens is one method of paying a third party for
services. This strategy provides an additional benefit of generating revenue;
however, it is not the sole approach available for government servicing of
property tax liens and increasing cash flow.60 This section describes three
primary tax lien management strategies—government servicing, contracted
servicing, and tax lien sales—and highlights critical differences for
governments to consider when selecting a strategy.
1. Keeping the Status Quo: Government Servicing
The first and traditional management option is for the local government to
service its delinquent tax digest, treating it just like any other government
service. The government retains ownership of the liens, enforces the liens, and
therefore directly receives all of the collections from property owners,
including all interest and penalties. In addition, the government has sole
control over all policy decisions regarding property tax foreclosure and tax
burden reduction.61
Local governments also directly incur all costs, which vary across
jurisdictions because of the significant variation in tax enforcement
procedures.62 Administrative costs result from the act of tax collection itself,
which may require the employment of tax collection agents.63 These costs are
often built into interest and fees associated with a property tax lien.64 There
also may be costs to the availability of public services. A government that
collects its own delinquent taxes must wait until the taxes are paid before it

60

See infra note 223; see also infra Parts II.B, III.
For example, they retain the ability to relieve the tax burden on elderly or disabled property owners or
release liens on vacant or abandoned properties to enable their transfer to other parties who might improve
them. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 43–44.
62 See supra text accompanying notes 31, 38–41 (summarizing the differing time frames and procedures
surrounding tax lien servicing, penalties associated with delinquency, and tax foreclosure).
63 See Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 160 (describing how staff and resources are needed to collect
taxes).
64 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.504(4)(d), (7) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (administrative cost
included in lien value), amended by Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 161, 2012 Ky. Acts 1; LUNDELL, supra note 8, at
2.
61
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spends the receipts on public services.65 As a result, cash flow may be
unpredictable66 and local governments must address revenue shortages through
an additional strategy, such as the acquisition of debt financing.
2. Privatized Servicing Through Sale and Contract
A second option for managing delinquent tax digests is for the local
government to treat tax collection as a government service that can be
privatized.67 Contracted servicing and tax lien sales are both methods of
accomplishing this privatization, but they have vastly differing effects. For
example, contracted servicing enables more government control and uses a
more transparent method of paying third-party servicers than do tax lien sales.
Contracted servicing involves hiring private parties to service the liens but
preserves government ownership of the liens.68 Because the government owns
the liens, it makes all decisions regarding tax foreclosure and the mitigation of
tax burdens, just as it would have if it serviced the liens itself. The government
also receives all of the collections in excess of the administrative costs of
servicing, which are paid in the form of contractor fees that can vary based on
the type of liens or collections.69 For example, Kentucky pays servicers 20% of
face value of the liens they service and an additional 13% of the liens’ face
value if the servicer has to take court action to file for foreclosure.70
Government use of contractors is generally justified by expectations of
increased efficiency and revenue.71 However, the degree to which benefits

65 In contrast, by selling tax liens, the local government obtains money before taxes are collected. See
LUNDELL, supra note 8, at 2.
66 However, historical data, such as rates of redemption and timing of property owners’ payments can be
used to project the quantity and date of availability of tax receipts. See generally CHAMAN L. JAIN & JACK
MALEHORN, BENCHMARKING FORECASTING PRACTICES: A GUIDE TO IMPROVING FORECASTING PERFORMANCE
46 (2006) (describing the use of historical data in data forecasting models).
67 See Christina N. Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization: Privacy in the Context of Tax Collection, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 632–33 (1997) (describing the privatization of federal income tax servicing).
68 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 2C(g)(2) (West 2009) (describing how government gives up
ownership when it sells the lien); M ISS. C ODE ANN . § 19-3-41(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010) (describing how
contracted servicers merely collect taxes and remit their entire collections, without a reduction for the cost of
collection, to the municipality).
69 See, e.g., K Y . R EV . S TAT . A NN . § 134.504(7) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), amended by Act of Apr.
23, 2012, ch. 161, 2012 Ky. Acts 1. Some states, such as Mississippi, collect the entire amount of taxes
collected and pay the servicer separately. M ISS . C ODE ANN . § 19-3-41(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010).
70 K Y . R EV . S TAT . A NN . § 134.504(7) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), amended by Act of Apr. 23, 2012,
ch. 161, 2012 Ky. Acts 1.
71 M IKESELL, supra note 11, at 15–17.
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accrue depends upon several factors, which include but are not limited to: how
a contractor performs in comparison to the government’s capacity to perform
the same function, whether any administrative cost savings accrue from using a
contractor, and whether any additional collections result from privatization.72
Servicers who are familiar with state and local laws regarding tax liens and tax
foreclosure, who know the local real estate market, and who have developed
effective servicing procedures are more likely to be the most efficient and
collect the most tax revenue.73 To this end, governments that use contracted
servicing can tailor their procurement process to select providers with the
greatest experience and history of results.74
Contracted servicing also permits the government to control the activity of
the third-party servicer through contract terms.75 The government can prohibit
certain activities and hold the private servicer accountable for meeting the
terms.76 For example, when the U.S. Internal Revenue Service hired
contractors to collect delinquent income taxes, its contract terms limited the
types of collection tactics that could be used and established penalties for
noncompliance.77
Finally, like government servicing, contracted servicing only generates
revenue as taxes are paid. Therefore, a local government that uses either
method must use a different strategy to generate the funds it needs to meet
budgetary demands, assuming that it is impractical to cut services by the
amount of outstanding tax receivables.
A third servicing option, tax lien sales, is similar to contracted servicing
because the sales transfer responsibility for servicing tax liens from the
government to a private party, but they differ in their form of payment to the
72 See Ellen Dannin, To Market, to Market: Legislating on Privatization and Subcontracting, 60 MD. L.
REV. 249, 268–71 (2001) (describing the factors to consider when comparing costs of privatization to costs of
government provision).
73 See Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 190–91.
74 See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33231, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE’S USE OF
PRIVATE DEBT COLLECTION AGENCIES: CURRENT STATUS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10 (2006) (describing an
IRS requirement that bidders on a tax collection contract have experience and a high “level of
accomplishment”).
75 See Smith, supra note 67, at 638–39 (describing how contracting out provides greater control than
does sale of an asset because the government can set contract terms).
76 Note, When Hope Falls Short: Hope VI, Accountability, and the Privatization of Public Housing, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1484–85 (2003) (stating that contract law can be enforced by the agency without use of
the courts); see Roin, supra note 21, at 2006 (describing how governments can allocate risks by setting
contractual terms with private providers).
77 GUENTHER, supra note 74, at 3.
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servicer. Instead of receiving a fee, the lien purchaser receives the interest and
penalties paid by the property owner to extinguish a lien because the purchaser
owns the debt and has the right to collect it.78 This debt can amount to a return
on investment of as high as 18% annually.79 In addition to having this high rate
of return, property tax liens are an attractive investment because their super
priority entitles their holder to be paid before the holder of any mortgage debt
or other subordinate encumbrance on the property. Tax lien sales are distinct
from a tax sale of the underlying property and do not vest in the purchaser a
possessory right to the property attached to the lien.80
The underlying transaction is the sale of future tax receivables as assets,
and like any other asset sale, the government gives complete control of the
asset (i.e., the lien) to the purchaser.81 In exchange, the government receives
immediate funds that reflect either the face value or partial face value of the
lien.82 Property tax lien sales also transfer the risk that a debt will never be
repaid83: purchasers lose money if an owner does not redeem the lien and if a
tax sale of the property cannot generate a purchase price greater than the lien’s
sale price.
Both individual and institutional investors purchase tax liens, including
large banks84 and businesses specifically formed for the purchase and
enforcement of property tax liens.85 The fact that institutional investors have
become increasingly involved in tax lien sales underscores the strong financial
incentive associated with lien purchases.86 The authorization and use of tax
lien sales are discussed in the following section.

78 The sales vest in the purchaser the right to enforce the lien and accrue penalties and interest. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-195h (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19(b)(1) (West 2011).
79 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-146 (2011) (18% annual interest).
80 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19 (West 2011) (tax lien sales), with id. § 48-4-78 (tax sales of the
underlying property).
81 Smith, supra note 67, at 638.
82 See LUNDELL, supra note 8, at 2; infra text accompanying notes 97, 101, 106.
83 See OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, supra note 38, at 26; see also Jarrow & Tyagi, supra note 6, at 182
(noting that tax liens have “positive net present values even after adjusting for risk”).
84 Charles D. Rittenhouse, Comment, The True Costs of Not Paying Your Property Taxes in Ohio, 36 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 221, 223 (2011) (describing the sale of $14.7 million in tax liens by Lucas County, Ohio to a
subsidiary of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.); Rob O’Dell, Bailed-Out Banks Snap Up Tax Liens, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, Aug. 7, 2011, at A1 (describing the sale of approximately $14.4 million in tax liens to banks since the
2008 bailout—more than double the pre-bailout sales).
85 See, e.g., MUN. ASSET PROVIDERS, http://www.municipalassetprovider.com/ (last visited Aug. 16,
2012); REVENUE SERVS., LLC, http://www.revenueserv.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
86 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
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3. Property Tax Lien Sales: Enforcement and Revenue Strategy
Property tax lien sales comprise an approximate $20 billion market.87 The
sales are more than just a servicing strategy—they are a financing solution.
Property tax lien sales are often authorized through state legislation, after
which their use is generally elective.88 State laws set varying levels of local
government discretion regarding how liens are sold.89 This variation is
particularly visible in the methods of sale, which include auctions and
negotiated sales.90 An enabling statute may also contain limited guidelines
regarding which properties can be sold91 and who can purchase the liens.92
First, a government can sell liens through traditional auctions93 or virtual
auctions.94 Auctions generally sell individual tax liens, but some states use
auctions to sell liens both individually and in bulk.95 Pricing is either set by
bidding up the purchase price or bidding down the interest or penalties that lien
purchasers can collect from property owners.96 Some states require that the
auctioned liens be sold for no less than their face value while other states
permit liens to be sold at a lesser price.97
87

Jarrow and Tyagi, supra note 6, at 181.
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-195h (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19(b)(1) (West 2011).
89 Compare CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 4528 (West 1998) (allowing tax collector to sell liens in bulk or
individually and through negotiation or auction), and NEV . R EV . S TAT . ANN . §§ 361.7312, .7314 (West 2011)
(giving county treasurers full discretion regarding how property tax liens are sold), with C OLO . R EV . S TAT .
ANN . § 39-11-108 (West 2007) (requiring property tax liens to be sold by auction).
90 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-195h (2011) (permitting negotiated sales); infra text accompanying notes
95–96, 98–101.
91 KY. REV. STAT. § 134.128(2)(c)(3) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (prohibiting purchase of certificates of
delinquency for properties under an approved payment plan in good standing), amended by Act of Apr. 23,
2012, ch. 161, 2012 Ky. Acts 1.
92 E.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 48-3-19(g) (West 2011) (requiring transferees who purchase more than $2
million in liens per calendar year to have an office in the jurisdiction); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/21-265(a)(2)
(2011) (excluding owners of, or parties responsible for, paying taxes on a property in the county that has been
delinquent); KY. REV. STAT. § 134.128(2)(d)(3) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011) (prohibiting purchases by multiple
related entities and parties purchasing on behalf of related entities), amended by Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 161,
2012 Ky. Acts 1.
93 See, e.g., A RIZ. R EV . STAT . A NN . § 42-18106(A)(2) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:80(II-a)
(2003); see also Alexander, supra note 28, at 762 & n.89.
94 E.g., C OLO . REV . STAT . A NN . § 39-11-108(1) (West 2007); FLA. S TAT § 197.432(1) (2012).
95 A LA. C ODE § 40-10-182(b) (2011) (both individually and in bulk).
96 Compare A RIZ. R EV . S TAT . A NN . § 42-18114 (2006) (bid down interest), amended by Act of Apr. 22,
2008, ch. 65, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1, with C OLO . R EV . S TAT . ANN . § 39-11-115 (West 2007) (bid up
purchase price).
97 Compare A RIZ. R EV . S TAT . A NN . § 42-18114 (2006) (requiring the sale price to be at least face
value), amended by Act of Apr. 22, 2008, ch. 65, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1, with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 80:80(II-a) (2003) (containing no requirement regarding sale price but allowing government officials to set a
88
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Second, a government can sell liens through negotiated sales, including
bulk sales or individual sales.98 The sale involves private negotiations of a
purchase price and, in some cases, negotiation of the interest or penalties that
the investor can charge the property owners.99 Although some jurisdictions
have a minimum sale price set by state law,100 investors often purchase liens at
a price lower than the face value of the lien.101
In both auctions and negotiated sales, purchasers stand to collect the
difference between the purchase price and the lien’s face value—which can be
as high as 25% to 30% of the lien’s face value102—plus any interest or
penalties that accrue.103 In jurisdictions that sell liens for less than their face
value, the purchaser can receive an even greater return on investment. In
jurisdictions that require tax liens to be sold for face value, the purchaser still
collects any interest or penalties that accrue on the lien over the course of the
delinquency.104
A third variation of a tax lien sale is the sale of a large volume of property
tax liens and subsequent securitization of that bundle of liens to help finance
the sale.105 Similar to other means of municipal financing, the liens are then
used to finance the government through the sale of bonds. For example, New
York City sells a bundle of property tax liens to a trust for less than the total
face value of the liens and is paid with funds that the trust borrows from
minimum price), and R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-5-73(c) (West 2006) (rate may be discounted “to reflect
uncollectible factors”).
98 See, e.g., C AL. R EV . & T AX . C ODE § 4528 (West 1998); M ASS . G EN . L AWS A NN . ch. 60, § 2C(b)–
(c) (West 2009) (bulk sales); see also Alexander, supra note 28, at 762 & n.88.
99 E.g., M ASS . G EN . L AWS A NN . ch. 60, § 2C(c)(2) (West 2009) (stating that tax liens may “be sold
either at a discount of not more than 50 per cent of the interest on the receivable or at a premium”).
100 See supra text accompanying note 98. Compare A RIZ. REV . STAT . A NN . § 42-18114 (2006), amended
by Act of Apr. 22, 2008, ch. 65, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1, with R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-5-73(c) (West
2006).
101 E.g., C ONN . G EN . S TAT . § 12-195h (2011) (permitting the municipality to determine the sale price);
M ASS . G EN . LAWS ANN . ch. 60, § 2C(c) (West 2009) (permitting sale at less than face value); see Alexander,
supra note 28 at 760.
102 Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 162.
103 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-195h (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19(b)(1) (West 2011).
104 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
105 E.g., D.C. CODE § 47-1303.04(a)–(c) (2005); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1190 (McKinney 2000 &
Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.082 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); id. § 321.341 (West 2005 & Supp.
2009); id. § 1724.01(B)(2)(a) (West 2009) (counties containing a county land reutilization corporation—
created to facilitate “the reclamation, rehabilitation, and reutilization of vacant, abandoned, tax-foreclosed, or
other real property”—can securitize tax liens). Some businesses gear their operations toward securitization
services (e.g., “Delinquent Tax and Asset Bonds”). Delinquent Tax and Asset Bond (DTAB) Program, MUN.
ASSET PROVIDERS, http://www.municipalassetprovider.com/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
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investors.106 The transaction provides the city with immediate access to
funds.107 The trust then hires a servicer to collect unpaid taxes and any interest
or penalties on those taxes.108 Bondholders who invested in the security then
are repaid their investment, plus interest, with the dollars collected by the
servicer.109 The government then receives the excess of the amount collected
by the servicers over the amount paid to the investors.110
One of the biggest challenges associated with securitized tax liens is
ensuring the quality of the underlying security.111 Performance of the security
is influenced by the amount of delinquent taxes, interest, and penalties
collected; therefore, performance is greater if the securitized liens are
reasonably likely to be redeemed.112 If the government securitizes a bundle that
has too many liens that are unlikely to be redeemed, the government creates a
risk of collecting less than the amount that it owes investors.113 For example,
poor selection of securitized lien pools in the cities of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and Jersey City, New Jersey prevented investors from receiving a
return on their investment.114 As a result, tax lien sales require accurate
assessment of the liens’ risk of nonpayment. Tax lien sales provide a cash flow
solution that government servicing and contracted servicing cannot, but they
also create a degree of risk. Because of this risk, the decision to sell tax liens
should be based on a determination that the benefit outweighs it. The following
section analyzes in further detail the benefits and risks of tax lien sales.

106 JERILYN PERINE ET AL., CITIZENS HOUS. & PLANNING COUNCIL, THE INVISIBLE TRANSFORMATION:
TURNING DEBT INTO REVENUE 10 (2010) (summarizing the city’s securitization of property tax liens between
1996 and 2008 with data provided by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 10 chart 1.
109 See id. at 15–16 (reporting that eleven of thirteen trusts had repaid their lenders and the remaining two
were projected to do so).
110 See id. (noting that New York City reports $89.3 million in surplus collections for thirteen tax lien
securitizations).
111 Cf. ANN RUTLEDGE & SYLVAIN RAYNES, ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURED FINANCE 600 (2010) (describing
how tax lien securitization has been largely unsuccessful due to poor planning by governments).
112 PERINE ET AL., supra note 107, at 8–11, 16.
113 See OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, supra note 38, at 26–27 (stating that more than 56% of the portfolio
was not collectible and that more then one-third of the properties included in the sale had high lien-to-value
ratios); RUTLEDGE & RAYNES, supra note 111, at 601.
114 OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, supra note 38, at 23, 26–27; PERINE ET AL., supra note 106, at 24–26;
RUTLEDGE & RAYNES, supra note 112, at 600–01.
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II. COMPARING EFFECTS OF TAX LIEN MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
The fact that a market exists for tax liens indicates that both buyer and
seller benefit. What is less clear is whether what results is a reasonable
exchange. The exchange cannot solely be evaluated by looking at the financial
impact at the time of the sale because the exchange creates financial, social,
and legal risks and benefits. This Comment argues that government officials
are making a policy decision when they choose a tax lien management
strategy,115 and as such, the decision should incorporate a rational financial
analysis of (1) whether the benefits justify the risks and (2) whether the
strategy provides the most benefit to taxpayers. This Part describes the factors
that should be included in such an analysis and summarizes the differing
effects of government servicing, contracted servicing, and tax lien sales. It
concludes that, compared to other strategies, tax lien sales create greater
externalities: a risk of lower economic rates of return, political accountability
challenges, and constitutional and consumer protection concerns.
A. Diminished Control and Community Costs
Unlike government servicing or contracted servicing, tax lien sales create
negative externalities that increase aggregate social costs. Tax lien purchasers
do not compensate local governments for these costs, and therefore community
residents and the government itself pay for them. These costs result from both
diminished government control over decisions that affect community
development efforts and the profit motive of tax lien purchasers. However, the
sales also provide some degree of social benefit because the revenue they
generate permits the government to continue providing public services, which
may partially offset the social costs.
Social costs result from tax lien sales’ transfer of authority to initiate tax
foreclosure from the government to the purchaser in some jurisdictions.116 This
transfer has a significant impact because tax foreclosures present an
opportunity for more than just the recovery of delinquent taxes. They also can
be used strategically as part of community development efforts, particularly in

115 See NANCEY GREEN LEIGH, BROOKINGS INST., THE STATE ROLE IN URBAN LAND REDEVELOPMENT 3–
4 (2003) (describing government decisions addressing tax delinquency).
116 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-78(a) (West 2011) (tax commissioner initiates), with KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 131.500 (West 2010), and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.490(2) (West 2010) (purchaser of lien initiates),
amended by Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 161, 2012 Ky. Acts 1.
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blighted and depressed areas.117 In some uses, foreclosures can increase the
value of surrounding properties or improve the stability of a neighborhood if
the foreclosed property is sold to a new owner who continues its upkeep and
remains current on tax obligations.118 Further, when used at an early stage of
tax delinquency, tax foreclosures can protect property from deterioration.119
However, the use of tax foreclosures also creates a risk of reduced property
values and diminished property condition,120 particularly in modest-income
neighborhoods.121 The mere act of foreclosure diminishes the values of other
nearby properties at a minimum of nearly 1% per foreclosed property.122 Weak
demand for property in such neighborhoods, which is further compounded by
the oversupply of property due to the mortgage foreclosure crisis, impedes the
sale of low-value tax-foreclosed properties,123 such as properties with high
lien-to-value ratios.124 Conversely, risk tends to be lower for tax liens that are
attached to properties with low lien-to-value ratios and for liens that have a
short history of delinquency.125
The type of purchaser also affects foreclosure outcomes.126 Low-value, taxforeclosed property is more likely to either be abandoned or purchased by a
speculator that will only strip value from the property, rather than by a new

117

E.g., PERINE ET AL., supra note 106, at 8–20 (discussing use of tax lien securitization of certain
properties to improve community economic development); An Overview of Land Banking in Syracuse and
Onondaga County, ONONDAGA COUNTY SUSTAINABLE DEV. PLAN, http://future.ongov.net/wp-content/
uploads/2011/08/An-Overview-of-Land-Banking-in-Syracuse-and-Onondaga-County.pdf (last visited Aug. 16,
2012) (describing use of a land bank program to manage and repurpose tax delinquent properties).
118 This is more likely in wealthier communities and less likely in an already depressed and blighted area.
See MALLACH, supra note 21, at 6.
119 See Alexander & Powell, supra note 38, at 3. Properties going through foreclosure are often stripped of
their value by their current owners. Id.
120 See infra notes 122–27 and accompanying text.
121 See MALLACH, supra note 21, at 6.
122 Several studies conducted using different methodologies, years, and locations indicate that property
value reductions between about 1% and nearly 9% result from nearby foreclosures. Kai-yan Lee,
Foreclosure’s Price-Depressing Spillover Effects on Local Properties: A Literature Review 2–6 (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Bos., Discussion Paper No. 2008-01, 2008).
123 See MALLACH, supra note 21, at 6.
124 These ratios compare a lien’s face value to a property’s market value or assessed value.
125 See PERINE ET AL., supra note 107, at 8–11, 17–18. For this reason, New York City classifies liens that
are worth less than 15% of the total property value as good candidates for bulk sale and securitization. Id. at 8,
11.
126 See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (describing the range of purchasers who may either
improve or harm the property purchased).
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owner, developer, or adjacent property owner.127 Property abandonment, if it
occurs, can lead to increased crime and fire hazard.128 In addition, properties
with diminished values will have lower tax assessments that reduce the amount
of tax owed. This in turn decreases the total tax base and corresponding tax
revenues that the government receives in future years.129 The failure to pursue
a timely tax foreclosure can also reduce future tax revenues if the property
deteriorates or is abandoned without a tax-compliant owner.130
Although these risks are present in all strategies for managing a tax lien
digest, the risk is lesser when government officials control the foreclosure
process because their incentives are different than those of a lien purchaser.
Government officials serve the interests of their citizens. Therefore, they are
more likely to strategically use tax foreclosures for public benefit.131 Their
incentives are (1) to quickly collect tax revenues that are owed;132 (2) to collect
interest and penalties to the extent needed to compensate for enforcement costs
and the cost of receiving delayed payment; (3) to minimize property neglect
and abandonment, and the resultant social costs for police and fire services; (4)
to minimize adverse externalities on adjoining properties and neighborhoods;
and (5) to ensure that tax delinquent properties are transferred to new owners
that will pay taxes and use the properties in a manner consistent with public
policies.133
Government officials are also uniquely positioned to ensure that tax
foreclosures are implemented consistently and quickly enough to be an

127 See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (describing the potential negative consequences that can
result from certain types of tax foreclosure sale purchasers).
128 John Accordino & Gary T. Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned Property Problem, 22 J.
URB. AFF. 301, 303 (2000).
129 See Alan C. Weinstein, Current and Future Challenges to Local Government Posed by the Housing
and Credit Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 259, 267 (2009). For example, Lucas County, Ohio had the most
foreclosure filings in the state as of 2011, and as a result, the county auditor predicted that property tax
revenues could decrease by 10% due to a reduced tax base. Rittenhouse, supra note 84, at 235, 237.
130 See Alexander & Powell, supra note 38, at 3; Smith, supra note 54, at 30 (describing how the length of
the previous foreclosure process in Michigan allowed properties “to deteriorate and contribute to urban
blight”).
131 See Roy W. Bahl Jr., Local Government Expenditures and Revenues, in MANAGEMENT POLICIES IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 79, 79 (J. Richard Aronson & Eli Schwartz eds., 5th ed. 2004) (“The most
important fiscal role of local government is to decide on the level and mix of taxes and expenditures that best
match the needs and preferences of the local population.”).
132 M.B. Pell, Fulton: Lien Sales Needed, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 27, 2011, at B1 (describing how tax
commissioners’ goals are to “collect delinquent taxes quickly,” whereas lien purchasers have a financial
incentive to collect taxes slowly).
133 See, e.g., An Overview of Land Banking in Syracuse and Onondaga County, supra note 117.
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effective tax enforcement and community revitalization tool because they are
charged with implementing tax enforcement procedures.134 They are able to
implement foreclosures as part of a larger community development effort, in
which the foreclosed properties are not always sold to the highest bidder but
instead may be transferred to a government or nongovernment entity that has
plans to use, improve, or restore the property.135 For example, properties can
be transferred to land banks, which maintain the properties and dispose of them
strategically using the proceeds from property tax interest and penalties.136
Other municipalities select certain types of “distressed” properties that need
intervention to improve their condition and transfer the properties so that they
can be rehabilitated.137 Government officials also are enabled by statute to
forgive or reduce tax burdens or approve payment plans, which may help
disadvantaged populations maintain property ownership.138
In contrast, tax lien purchasers are solely motivated by profit and lack the
capacity or incentive to incorporate tax foreclosures into an overall community
development strategy.139 As a result, the party making foreclosure decisions
when tax liens are sold (in some jurisdictions) is a private party who is wholly
removed from any community development policies or strategies set by
government officials.140 This party only has one incentive—to act in a manner
that produces the greatest financial return.141 The purchaser is unlikely to use
foreclosure to achieve any public benefit unless required to do so.142 It would
be in the lien purchaser’s interest, for example, to facilitate the slow payment
of tax liens so that the debt accrues interest and penalties over a longer period
rather than quickly implement foreclosure. During this extended period, the
owner may damage or devalue the property, which can reduce the value of
134 See supra text accompanying notes 30–34 (describing municipalities’ differing tax enforcement
procedures).
135 See An Overview of Land Banking in Syracuse and Onondaga County, supra note 117 (discussing how
the “Genesee County Land Bank Model” can revitalize a blighted community).
136 See id.
137 See, e.g., PERINE ET AL., supra note 107, at 11–12, 20 (detailing a property rehabilitation and transfer
program).
138 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
139 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2003)
(describing how privatization creates a moral hazard that private actors will “exploit their position in
government programs to advance their own financial or partisan interests,” which may conflict with public
policy goals); Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 200 (stating that tax lien purchasers only participate in
development efforts if they benefit financially or if there is a framework that requires them to participate).
140 Cf. Metzger, supra note 139, at 1372; Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 200.
141 See Metzger, supra note 139, at 1372.
142 See Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 200.

MARCHIONY PROOFS1

238

10/31/2012 8:02 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:217

neighboring property.143 Similarly, in a situation where a municipality might
transfer ownership to a party who could improve or maintain the property,
without fully recovering the tax debt, a lien purchaser would sell the property
to the highest bidder, regardless of the bidder’s intent for the property.
Unlike government servicing or contracted servicing, tax lien sales create a
risk of significant social costs; however, they also create cash flow, which
presents a substantial financial benefit.144 This benefit may partially offset
social costs because it allows the government to provide services that
otherwise would be unfunded.145 However, tax lien sales are not the only
financing tool available. As discussed in the following section, if other
methods of financing can be used alongside a servicing method that avoids
social costs and the other risks described in the following sections, the use of
those methods should be strongly considered.
B. A Questionable Rate of Return
Because governments are constantly working to do more with limited
resources, it is critical that they receive the greatest return from their assets. To
do so, governments should be able to compare the costs and benefits of tax lien
sales against other options that serve the same purposes. The sale price of tax
liens should compensate the government for the discounted present value of
the forgone interest and penalties on the lien minus the costs transferred to the
purchaser, which include a minimal risk of nonpayment146 and the
administrative cost of collection.147 However, the multi-purpose nature of a tax
lien sale as both a financing strategy and a servicing method makes it difficult
to separate each of these components of the sale price from one another. The
administrative and financing costs are buried within the tax lien sale price and
the future tax collections forgone by a government. As a result, tax lien sales
tend to mask the underlying calculus of what a government exchanges for
immediate funds and for tax collection services.
First, the dual purpose of tax lien sales as tax enforcement and a revenue
strategy obscures the amount that local governments exchange with the

143

See Alexander & Powell, supra note 38, at 3. See Smith, supra note 54, at 30, for a description of the
potentially negative impact of a lengthy foreclosure process.
144 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 153–57.
147 See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
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purchaser. When local governments sell their tax liens, the administrative cost
that they pay is hidden because the government is not incurring a specific
expenditure. However, a cost still exists.148 The government pays the purchaser
for servicing its liens with the right to collect future interest and penalties.149
Accordingly, an implicit administration cost is embedded within the sale price
and the total forgone delinquent tax revenue.
The financing cost of receiving immediate funds is also included within the
sale price and the foregone tax revenue, which obscures what the government
is giving in exchange. The true price that the government pays for financing is
reflected in the purchaser’s financial return from the sale (the forgone interest
and penalties collected on the liens) minus the implicit administration cost
paid. Because the sale price of liens is often either their face value or less, the
lien purchaser’s return can be significant because it includes nearly the entire
upside of the interest that the liens accrue—which can near or exceed 18%
annually.150 Because both financing and administrative costs are so difficult to
differentiate from one another, it is difficult to compare tax lien sales to other
strategies.
In contrast, government servicing and contracted servicing create costs and
benefits that are relatively easy to discern. Because they are the only party
involved, local governments that provide their own servicing directly receive
the full amount collected from property owners—including all interest and
penalties—and they bear all of the costs. These costs are reflected in the
government’s financial records. Similarly, if governments use contracted
servicing, they receive all of the collections in excess of administrative costs
and have included the rate they pay for such administration costs in the
contract with the servicer.151 Therefore, the amount collected and the amount
paid to the servicer could be calculated from financial records. Financing costs
would also be transparent if the government borrowed the same amount of
funding that they receive from sales because there would be a clear interest rate
applied to the principal.
As a result of the hidden costs of tax lien sales, it is difficult to determine
what the best sale price is for a particular lien or a set of liens because the

148

See supra Part I.C.3.
See supra Part I.C.3. The sale price may, however, account for the present value of the redemption
amounts.
150 See supra notes 82, 97, 100–03 and accompanying text.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 69–70.
149
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appropriate price will vary by lien. Making such a determination requires a
consideration of historical data regarding how many liens are redeemed and
when; application of a discount rate for the cost of receiving money later rather
than sooner; and a comparison of current costs to what the cost would be to use
government servicing and another source of revenue generation. Because tax
lien sales transfer a government service to a third party, they only should occur
if they provide cost savings or if the services cannot otherwise be provided.
Second, because the amount of interest that governments forgo—and thus
the combined servicing and financing expense—is so high, the amount is likely
higher than the low cost of government debt financing, even when discounting
the value of receiving the interest revenue in the future.152 Some portion of that
forgone interest compensates the purchaser for the risk of nonpayment and the
administrative costs of servicing the liens; the remainder is effectively a
financing charge paid to the purchaser (and an investor’s rate of return on the
investment).
However, the risk of nonpayment should be minimal. Most delinquencies
are resolved before the final transfer of a property through foreclosure sale,153
which indicates that many taxpayers only delay payment and ultimately satisfy
their tax obligations. For example, DeKalb and Fulton Counties in Georgia
report that they eventually collect 99% of property taxes, and DeKalb County
only completed tax sales for approximately 3.5% of delinquent properties in
2009.154 Similarly, 85% of foreclosed tax liens in Michigan were redeemed
after foreclosure but before the property was titled to another party.155 Delayed
payment is not a risk. Rather, it is the ideal circumstance for a lien purchaser
because it increases the value of the investment by increasing the interest it
accrues. Even if the payment of taxes is delayed until the tax sale of a property,
the tax lien purchaser still benefits from such a delay because the sale price
includes penalties and interest that have accrued.156
The few properties with liens that exceed or nearly exceed the property
value are the only properties for which there is a true risk of nonpayment.157
Properties with high lien-to-value ratios are not likely to recover the full debt
152

See infra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
Smith, supra note 54, at 36; Pell, supra note 132.
154 Pell, supra note 132.
155 Smith, supra note 54, at 36.
156 See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text.
157 See RUTLEDGE & RAYNES, supra note 111, at 601; Smith, supra note 54, at 36 (describing how the
majority of tax liens are ultimately paid).
153

MARCHIONY PROOFS1

2012]

10/31/2012 8:02 AM

MAKING DEBT PAY

241

because they are worth less than the debt. The true risk of purchased tax liens,
then, is how much of the tax lien will be paid.
Therefore, depending on administrative costs of servicing, the cost of tax
lien sales potentially exceeds the cost of other servicing and financing options,
as described in the following example.158 If a government sells a lien even at
its full face value, and that lien accrues interest of 18% annually,159 it forgoes
the opportunity to receive 118% of face value if redeemed after one year, or
nearly 140% if redeemed after two years. Even after applying a discount rate to
account for the diminished value of collecting the money later in time, only a
small portion of the 18% interest forgone would likely be offset. Some portion
of the interest that is not offset compensates the purchaser for the low risk of
nonpayment and the administrative costs of servicing the liens; the remainder
is effectively a financing charge paid to the purchaser (an investor’s rate of
return on the investment). In comparison, if the government instead serviced its
own liens and borrowed funds at a rate even as high as 6% in short term
notes,160 the annual 18% interest accruing on the liens would offset the interest
accruing on the principal, creating an effective cost of around 112% of the
liens’ value.
If governments are indeed missing an opportunity to earn additional
revenue, economic theory tells us that there must be a cause. In theory, all
prices determined on the market should provide adequate compensation in a
sale that is an arm’s length transaction.161 One possibility is that the complex
calculus of tax lien sales’ costs creates information asymmetry, in which
purchasers have more precise information about the prices of other liens sold
than do government officials. Another possibility is that the governments’

158 See LUNDELL, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that governments selling liens “may receive less revenue than
if the lien was [serviced by the government and] redeemed, with interest, by the property holder” and that,
“[t]herefore, the effect on revenue is indeterminate”).
159 This example uses the 18% interest rate associated with several states, which may be greater or lesser
in some jurisdictions. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34. Although lien purchasers in some
jurisdictions bid down the interest when purchasing the liens in auctions, this percentage is still available to
local governments if they service the liens. See supra text accompanying note 96.
160 To be conservative, this Comment assumes these are taxable securities. Returns for taxable municipal
bonds are approximately 6%, whereas tax-exempt tax anticipation notes can have returns closer to 2%.
Compare CMTY. CAPITAL MGMT., supra note 8, at 6 (describing taxable municipal bond rates of
approximately 6%), with BARBARA J. SCHOTT, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL
REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED FEBRUARY 28, 2011, at 80 (2011) (citing a return of 1.5%–2.5% for tax
anticipation notes).
161 Such a transaction occurs when the buyer and seller of a product act independently and have no
relationship with one another, and therefore are acting in their own self-interest.
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heightened demand for immediate funds helps increase the price they are, in
effect, willing to pay for those funds.
In sum, local governments lack the ability to determine the financial impact
of using tax lien sales instead of an alternative servicing or financing strategy.
The cost is potentially excessive, similar to those charged to consumers in
payday and title lending schemes. With local governments working from such
limited resources, it is critical that governments compare the costs of their
financing and servicing options before they select a method to ensure they are
efficiently using those resources. Further, even if tax lien sales were a costefficient servicing method, the sales diminish political accountability and
create consumer protection and constitutional concerns.162 As discussed in the
following sections, these effects, along with the aggregate social costs of the
sales, should give government officials pause when deciding whether to sell
tax liens.
C. Obscured Accountability and Debt
Tax lien sales obscure what is, in effect, government borrowing, which
impedes accountability and transparency. First, the sales conceal the actual
financial condition of a government because they hide from public purview
what is, in effect, debt financing. Second, the sales create a buffer that
decreases taxpayers’ ability to attribute the sales’ outcomes to the actions of
public officials. Finally, as discussed in the previous section, the sales obstruct
the true cost of servicing and financing and make it difficult for both taxpayers
and governments to weigh the soundness of officials’ decisions to sell the
liens.163
First, the sale of property tax liens allows local governments to obscure the
amount of debt that they would otherwise need to accrue. State and local
jurisdictions frequently employ transactions that are similar in substance to
incurring debt, yet distinctive enough to be excluded from such restrictions.164
Similar to the function of debt, tax lien sales exchange future government
revenue (delinquent tax collections) for immediate funds.165 For example, if a
162

See infra Part II.C–D.
See Roin, supra note 21, at 2020–21 (describing how the sale of tax receivables obscures the public’s
ability to understand and evaluate the costs and benefits of the sales).
164 Id. at 1978.
165 See id. at 1977–78, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2023 (asserting that the sale of tax receivables through the guise
of privatization is a form of incurring “nondebt debt”); see also Robert Bifulco et al., Debt and Deception:
How States Avoid Making Hard Fiscal Decisions, PUB. ADMIN. REV., 2 (Apr. 30, 2012), http://onlinelibrary.
163
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local government sells liens that have a $1.5 million face value for $1 million,
the transaction can be described as the government borrowing $1 million and
paying in interest the $0.5 million difference between the sale price and face
value plus future interest payments on the face value.166 As a result, the
government borrows, in effect, money at an interest rate that varies based on
actual tax collections.167 Because this constructive interest rate is not defined
before the transaction occurs, the government is unable to compare the rate to
other rates on the market and select the most cost-effective financing method.
Unlike forms of borrowing that we traditionally identify as debt, which are
measurable and transparent, tax lien sales and other debt alternatives receive
less attention and have effects that are difficult to measure.168
Second, the sale of tax liens weakens political accountability, which is a
fundamental component of democratic governance169 and reflects a
government’s duty to ensure that its actions serve public interests.170 This duty
includes ensuring that the government is not overpaying for the provision of
public services such as tax collection.171 Accountability requires some level of
transparency so that citizens, lawmakers, and advocacy groups172 can
determine whether public interests have been met and provide “political
feedback” through the electoral process.173 Tax lien sales place a buffer
between elected public officials, such as city council members or mayors, and
the actions of lien purchasers that they have indirectly authorized.

wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02533.x/asset/j.1540-6210.2012.02533.x.pdf (defining government
borrowing broadly as “occur[ing] whenever the government forgoes control over some future flow of
resources or benefits in order to acquire resources for current use”).
166 Cf. Roin, supra note 21, at 1997 (describing how the city of Chicago’s sale of future parking meter
revenues can be described as the city borrowing “$1.156 billion, but rather than pay interest on the debt at a set
rate, it agreed to pay a contingent rate of interest both measured and secured by seventy-five years of parking
meter revenues” (footnote omitted)).
167 Cf. id.
168 See Bifulco et al., supra note 165.
169 See Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share the
Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 186 (1997).
170 See Bahl, supra note 131, at 79 (“The most important fiscal role of local government is to decide on
the level and mix of taxes and expenditures that best match the needs and preferences of the local
population.”).
171 See id. at 79–81.
172 This Comment collectively refers to these parties as taxpayers.
173 See TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD GOVERNMENT 37
(2006) (describing that, for actual accountability to occur, the parties that hold politicians accountable must
have adequate information); Roin, supra note 21, at 2020–21.
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Political accountability requires an ability to attribute a particular action
and its outcome to a government official.174 When a local government services
its own tax digest, any decisions that are made are clearly attributable to
decisions of public officials because they are based on actions of and
procedures set by those officials.175 As a result, taxpayers can readily make
their own judgments about, and provide feedback on, the government’s actions
and the risks and social costs that result from those actions. In contrast, when a
government sells the right to service liens to a private purchaser, it transfers
some of these same functions to another party. After sale, a government can
only control a private purchaser’s actions through statutory and regulatory
requirements.176 Private parties, and not government officials, foreclose on
property owners. Taxpayers are unable to hold these individuals politically
accountable because they are not elected, though they still may hold the
officials who enabled the sales responsible.
Finally, the use of tax lien sales reduces the transparency of outcomes
against which taxpayers can measure officials’ performance. The availability
of sufficient information is critical for ensuring actual, and not merely
theoretical, accountability.177 As discussed, the sale of tax liens involves the
constructive payment of servicing and financing fees to the lien purchasers,
which are embedded in the sale price of the liens and the forgone future
collections of interest and penalties.178 The dual purposes of tax lien sales
make it difficult to separate administrative and financing costs, which hamper
the ability of taxpayers to judge whether the payment is reasonable in
exchange for the immediate revenue that tax lien sales provide.179 The

174 See Sabatino, supra note 169, at 186–87 (stating that typically members of the public hold government
officials accountable in the electoral process for their decisions).
175 Municipal governments generally have a council-management structure or a mayor-council structure
and are controlled by elected officials (city council members and a mayor, respectively). Forms of Local
Government Structure, INT’L CITY/COUNTY MGMT. ASS’N (2008), http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_
network/documents/kn/Document/9135/Forms_of_Local_Government_Structure. These parties consider which
strategy to use to service their delinquent tax lien digest and can elect to sell the liens. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
176 For example, some state statutes set waiting periods before purchasers can contact property owners or
begin the tax foreclosure process. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 197.432(13) (2012) (establishing waiting period before
purchaser can contact “to encourage or demand payment”); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-3-19(e)(1) (2011) (requiring
purchaser to wait until the earlier of either one year after lien purchased or twenty-four months after taxes
due).
177 BESLEY, supra note 173, at 37.
178 See supra Part II.B.
179 See supra note 173 and accompanying text; see also Bifulco et al., supra note 165, at 2 (stating that
“actions that are reported in budget and financial statements in ways that are difficult to assess will undermine
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government then receives insufficient public feedback regarding its decision
and is unable to determine if it is serving the interests of its constituents.
In contrast, the full costs could be calculated from internal financial
records180 when government servicing or contracted servicing are used.181
Although the cost of paying a contractor may not be known until after contract
implementation begins,182 a government also has clear access to the records
necessary to determine cost—its payment records for the contract.
D. Protection of Taxpayer Interests
Tax lien sales may provide less protection of taxpayers’ rights than other
servicing methods. A government has a responsibility to ensure that the
activities it sanctions are protected from fraud or unfair dealing183 and to
ensure that citizens’ constitutional rights are protected. As consumers, property
owners should have access to information that enables prompt debt repayment
and reporting of any illegal debt collection activity. This information includes
the following: (1) when a lien has been sold, (2) who owns the lien and how
they can be contacted, and (3) if any terms of the debt have changed. Further,
because the government sanctions tax lien sales, citizens’ constitutional rights
should be protected throughout the sale process.
1. The Profit Motive and Consumer Protection
Tax lien sales create a risk that purchasers may use overzealous collection
practices because purchasers are driven by profit.184 This risk is evidenced by
substantial federal regulation of debt collection practices185 to limit actions
transparency” and asserting that traditional government borrowing methods have greater transparency than
alternatives, such as asset sales).
180 This estimate would primarily include a portion of personal services expenditures for staff members
who service liens as well as administrative overhead.
181 See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
182 For example, Kentucky pays its contracted servicers based on the face value of the liens they service
and the type of action they have to take to service the liens, which are either unknown or subject to change
before servicing begins. See KY . R EV . S TAT . ANN . § 134.504(7) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), amended by
Act of Apr. 23, 2012, ch. 161, 2012 Ky. Acts 1.
183 See Note, supra note 76, at 1480.
184 See Metzger, supra note 139, at 1372; Peter D. Byrne, Privatization in the Area of Tax Administration:
An Overview 13–14 (Harvard Inst. for Int’l Dev., Taxation Research Series No. 24, 1995).
185 See Byrne, supra note 184, at 13–14. For this reason, Congress passed the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act to protect taxpayers. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(b) (2006)
(finding “abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” and
inadequacy of existing laws to protect consumers). Because of this risk, Congress limited the practices of
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such as excessive contact, threats of arrest, calls to consumers at work, and
threats to family members.186 Adding to this risk, state and federal consumer
protection statutes may not apply to property tax lien purchasers’ collection
efforts. First, the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) relates to
personal debts, and a property tax lien is generally a property debt unattached
to a particular individual.187 Second, the FDCPA applies to debt collectors who
are not collecting a debt specifically owed to them, and tax lien purchasers
have a right to the delinquent tax debt that they are collecting.188
Tax lien sales also create difficulty for property owners because they do not
know who purchased their liens unless the local government or purchaser
notifies them, and such notification is statutorily required in few
jurisdictions.189 As a result, property owners may be unable to contact the new
lien holder, may not know how to redeem their lien, and may be unable to file
a complaint against the lien holder. Some lien purchasers resell the liens they
buy, which further impedes property owners’ ability to identify who owns a
lien attached to their property.190
2. Tax Lien Purchasers, State Action, and Due Process
Property tax enforcement by lien purchasers also creates uncertainty about
the protection of property owners’ constitutional rights. The Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits state actions that deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or

private debt collectors when the IRS privatized delinquent tax collection. See GUENTHER, supra note 74, at 3.
Congress also enabled the IRS to penalize misconduct by withholding compensation and banning future
participation. Id.
186 E.g., Press Release, Ga. Governor’s Office of Consumer Prot., Debt Collector Nelson, Hirsch &
Associates Enters into $4.3 Million Settlement with the Governor’s Office of Consumer Protection (Nov. 8,
2011) (on file with author). For example, in 2011, the Georgia Governor’s Office of Consumer Protection
entered into an agreement with a debt servicer that violated consumer protection laws by threatening debtors
with arrest, collecting more than the amount owed, and calling debtors up to fifty times a day. Id. The servicer
agreed to forgo collection of approximately $4.3 million and pay approximately $50,000 for civil penalties and
investigative and legal expenses. Id.
187 See FED. RESERVE, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, in CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 1
(2006).
188 Id.
189 ALA. CODE § 40-10-182(b) (2011) (stating that procedures for tax lien sales shall provide for notifying
the property owner that the lien has been sold); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-18106(A) (2006) (requiring
notification of lien sale to property owner).
190 Some lien purchasers later sell some of the liens to other parties. See, e.g., Invest in Tax Lien
Certificates, AM. TAX FUNDING SERVICING, http://www.atfs.com/tax-liens-for-sale.asp (last visited Aug. 16,
2012).
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property, without due process of law.”191 Tax foreclosure sales by local
governments are subject to Fourteenth Amendment due process constraints
because the sales deprive persons of their rights to property.192 The Supreme
Court has established that to comply with this constitutional obligation a
jurisdiction must give a property owner adequate notice prior to conducting a
tax sale.193
Although private conduct is not expressly governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment and generally is not required to protect due process rights,194 it
can be considered state action if the “nexus between the State and the
challenged action” is so close that behavior of the private actors is “fairly
treated as that of the State itself.”195 State action may be present when196 (1)
the “coercive power” of the State is used by a private actor,197 (2) the
government encourages the private party’s acts,198 (3) a private actor performs
a “public function” typically reserved to the state,199 (4) the state and the actor
undertake “joint activity,”200 or (5) the government has control over the private
actor.201
Courts have not yet considered whether tax foreclosure actions by tax lien
purchasers qualify as state action, and such an analysis is outside the scope of
this Comment.202 If state action does not apply, then constitutional due process
191

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798–800 (1983).
193 Id. at 798. Application of this holding varies widely. Alexander, supra note 28, at 750.
194 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156–58 (1978).
195 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295–96 (2001) (quoting
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196 See Stefan J. Padfield, Finding State Action when Corporations Govern, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 703, 715–
21 (2009), for a more detailed analysis of the tests for finding state action.
197 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
198 Id. (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
199 Id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627–28 (1991); West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 56 (1988)); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506–07 (1946). This test has been interpreted narrowly.
See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163–64 (noting in dicta that tax collection, education, and fire and police
protection are not services exclusively practiced by the state).
200 Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
201 Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts of Phila., 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957) (per
curiam)). However, government regulation of a privately provided service alone is not sufficient to establish
state action. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
202 It should be noted, however, that because the tests described above address the relationship between
the government and a private actor, courts would be more likely to ascribe state action to contracted servicing
than to tax lien sales because contracting creates an ongoing relationship between the government and a
192
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rights may not protect owners of properties for which liens have been sold;203
if it does apply, then new needs arise. The initial challenge would be to ensure
that purchasers are aware of the requisite notice required by due process.204
Creation of such awareness would be less onerous in states that have statutory
procedures for tax foreclosure sales that meet due process requirements. But in
states that leave a large amount of discretion regarding tax foreclosure to local
governments, the responsibility for defining procedures that meet due process
requirements would fall to each individual local government, each of which
would likely create varying standards.
In addition, if state action applies, there would be a heightened need for
implementing additional controls over purchaser-initiated tax sale notices.
Providing notice involves an additional cost. Because lien purchasers are
profit-driven,205 there is a risk that lien purchasers would forgo providing
notice if not required or periodically monitored for compliance. Tax lien sales
have a limited structure for controlling the actions of parties servicing the
liens206 when compared to contracted servicing, which has a framework for
control in the contract itself. For example, a local government can require
contractor compliance with due process requirements through terms in the
servicing agreement and can monitor the contractor’s conduct.207 The
government could also use tort law as recourse for noncompliance.208
Although tax lien sales provide an added benefit of increased funding for
public services, they also create negative externalities, limit the ability of
government agencies to control the community impact of delinquent property
taxes, and lack a transparent cost structure through which to analyze their
private actor, as well as a framework for government control (the contract). Tax lien sales eliminate any
relationship between the government and the servicer.
203 Because of a perceived disconnect between the practical realities of privatization and the protection of
constitutional rights, some commentators advocate adopting a new constitutional analysis for privatized
services. See, e.g., Sheila S. Kennedy, When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and
Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 203, 219–23 (2001); Metzger, supra note 139, at
1367.
204 For example, if notice of a tax sale is returned to the sender, some form of additional action is required,
but courts have not defined precisely what actions are sufficient. C. Jordan Myers, Comment, Learning to Live
with Jones v. Flowers: A “New Wrinkle” for an Old Standard, 57 EMORY L.J. 463, 493–96 (2007) (stating that
“state and local governments must evaluate whether their notice procedures are constitutionally adequate or
whether they need to be altered” in the wake of Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)).
205 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
206 Unless the purchaser signs a sales agreement with the government, state statutes and local regulations
are the only framework for requiring action by the purchaser.
207 See Metzger, supra note 139, at 1404.
208 Id.
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financial impact. These qualities make tax lien sales an acceptable short-term
solution to meet cash flow needs but a risky long-term strategy for public
budgeting and lien servicing. Part III proposes alternatives to tax lien sales that
have less risk and more benefit.
III. MAXIMIZING RETURN AND PROTECTING PUBLIC INTERESTS
An alternative to tax lien sales is to use two different transactions to
address budgetary shortfalls: one to generate cash flow and the other to service
delinquent liens. Assuming that it is impractical to cut government services
extensively to account for low property tax receipts, the most realistic
financing method is to borrow.209 Most local governments issue some form of
short-term debt to address revenue shortages, including revenue anticipation or
tax anticipation notes, which accrue relatively low interest and are secured by
specific expected taxes or revenues.210 Although governments may also
finance services and projects through long-term general obligation bonds,
which borrow against all of a government’s resources,211 the debt is more
costly and may be subject to constitutional and statutory restrictions, such as
dollar limits and pre-approval before debt issuance.212 In contrast, short-term
debt generally is not subject to such limitations.213 Long-term debt is also
undesirable because it is perceived as a signal of fiscal distress.214 Because of
the limitations and negative perceptions of debt, some governments use
activities that are economically similar to debt as debt substitutes.215
A type of short-term, tax-backed note, referred to by some as a “delinquent
tax anticipation note” (DTAN), can help eliminate or mitigate the risks

209 See Roin, supra note 21, at 1975–77 (describing governments’ frequent use of debt and subsequent
restrictions).
210 STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41735, STATE AND LOCAL G OVERNMENT DEBT: AN
ANALYSIS 2 (2011); Government Bonds, Market Data, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/
rates-bonds/government-bonds/us/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2012) (showing greater yield for the investor, and
therefore a higher payout by the government, for long-term municipal bonds compared to short-term bonds).
211 See Municipal Bonds, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/bonds/municipal-bonds (last visited Aug.
16, 2012).
212 Roin, supra note 21, at 1975–77; see also Government Bonds, supra note 210 (showing that the rate of
return on municipal bonds increases as the term of the bond increases so that longer term bonds have a higher
rate of interest that the government has to pay to bond holders).
213 Roin, supra note 21, at 1984–85.
214 Philip Kloha et al., Developing and Testing a Composite Model to Predict Local Fiscal Distress, 65
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 313, 319 (2005).
215 Roin, supra note 21 at 1977–2001.
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associated with using tax lien sales.216 DTANs treat the delinquent tax
obligations as assets against which funds can be borrowed rather than as an
asset to be sold.217 This Part argues that DTANs can be used alongside one of
three servicing strategies—government servicing, contracted servicing, or
consolidated government servicing—to meet both the operational and financial
needs of local governments. Then, it suggests contract terms that would allow
local governments to exert a similar level of control to that of government
servicing. Finally, it suggests that if states continue to allow tax lien sales, they
should provide for some level of control over purchasers’ actions through local
regulations.
A. Combining Control and Cash Flow
DTANs are government-issued notes secured by future delinquent property
tax collections.218 Investors purchase the notes and the sale revenue is used to
fund public services. After the government collects delinquent taxes, the
investors receive the principal of their investment, as well as a relatively low
interest rate.219 As described in this section, DTANs provide a cash-flow
benefit like that of tax lien sales and alleviate, or at least mitigate, the risks of
tax lien sales.220 Local governments are able to meet their cash-flow needs
while maintaining a more transparent expenditure of public funds, allowing the
government to retain control over housing policy decisions, minimizing
aggregate social costs, and potentially creating additional financial gain and
budgeting stability.
First, DTANs provide immediate funds and have the potential to provide a
greater return than tax lien sales. By servicing the liens itself, the government
benefits from the receipt of all penalties and interest paid by delinquent
taxpayers on their obligations.221 The rate at which the government borrows
216 See Memorandum from Matt Rubino, Office of Budget & Mgmt., to Comm’rs of Cuyahoga Cnty.,
Analysis of County Land Reutilization Corporation (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://blog.cleveland.com/
metro/2009/06/Land%20bank%20analysis.pdf (describing the use of DTANs).
217 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.2401 (West 2005).
218 See Municipal Bonds, supra note 211.
219 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
220 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.2401 (West 2005) (authorizing the use of delinquent tax-backed
securities). Michigan provided for such a strategy and repealed local governments’ authority to sell tax liens in
2002. Id. § 141.2303 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (describing qualifications needed to issue notes secured by
tax liens); id. § 141.2401; Act effective Apr. 29, 2002, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 113 (repealing statute that
authorized municipalities to sell tax liens).
221 See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing how the government directly receives all of the collections from
property owners, including all interest and penalties, when it retains ownership of and enforces the liens).
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money, which can be 6% or less,222 could provide an opportunity for arbitrage
because it is substantially lower than the 18% to 30% interest and penalties that
accrue on tax liens.223 Although a municipality does not collect the full interest
and penalties that tax liens accrue, like it would if it serviced the tax digest and
did not need a cash advance, it still receives a substantial portion of this
revenue, even after paying interest on the principal borrowed.224 Governments
that sell tax liens, however, typically receive none of this revenue.225 The
receipt of additional revenue is better for the government’s budget and
taxpayers, who benefit from the delinquency of other property owners instead
of private investors.
Second, DTANs enable greater government control over the use of tax
delinquent property in its overall policy agenda than do tax lien sales.226
Because their focus is on financing, DTAN-enabling statutes primarily govern
the issuance of the notes and not the servicing of liens.227 Local governments
that use DTANs tend to service their own delinquent tax digests228 and
therefore own tax liens instead of transferring them to a private purchaser.229
As a result, public officials determine when to file for foreclosure and when to
modify tax obligations for certain groups of taxpayers.230 Because government
officials retain control, they can be held politically accountable through the
electoral process.
In addition, the use of DTANs increases financial transparency, which
enhances the accuracy of the price the government pays, allows governments

222 See supra note 160. Although the interest earned on many municipal securities is exempt from federal
income taxes, which allows the local government to pay less interest, this Comment does not analyze whether
DTANs are or should be taxable or tax-exempt.
223 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-146 (2011) (18% annual interest); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/21-15
(2011) (1.5% monthly interest); IOWA CODE §§ 445.39, 447.1 (2011) (1.5% monthly interest that can increase
to 2%); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 140.100(1), .340(1) (2011) (up to 10% annual interest and 18% annual penalty);
supra text accompanying notes 33–34. A 1.5% monthly rate is equivalent to a 19.56% annual rate if
compounded.
224 Memorandum from Matt Rubino, supra note 216 (estimating that DTANs would result in $8 million in
delinquency penalties forgone by county).
225 See supra Part II.B.
226 See An Overview of Land Banking in Syracuse and Onondaga County, supra note 117, at 1 (stating
that DTANs “enable[] the County to maintain local control of the liens while recovering up to 115% of
delinquent tax revenue”).
227 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.082 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009) (providing for no additional means
of servicing).
228 Id.
229 See supra Part I.C.1.
230 See supra Part I.C.1.
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to evaluate the financial impact of their strategies, and further strengthens
accountability. By using DTANs, a government pays an interest rate that is
clearly established rather than hidden among a litany of other costs.231 The
interest rate also is easy to compare to the interest rate of other financing
strategies to determine if the government is paying the lowest price.232 Further,
because the government is borrowing funds rather than using a debt
substitute,233 the government more accurately presents its financial position
and the shortfalls resulting from tax delinquency.
For the same reason, DTANs can help minimize aggregate social costs and
risks to constitutional and consumer rights because a private party is only
involved with financing and not servicing. Consumer concerns about unfair
practices are reduced because the collection of delinquent taxes is not solely
driven by a profit motive. Constitutional due process violations are also less
likely because government officials should be more aware of their legal
obligations.
DTANs are similar to the securitization of bundles of purchased tax
liens,234 except a government that issues DTANs maintains ownership of the
liens. One of the biggest challenges associated with securitized tax lien sales is
selecting the liens to be included in the sale; similarly, the most important
decision regarding DTANs is determining the amount that should be borrowed.
Both of these decisions require an accurate forecast of future tax collections,
which can be based on historical data regarding which liens are redeemed
(rather than foreclosed upon) and how long it will take them to be redeemed.235
The amount borrowed through DTANs often will be some portion less than the
face value of the liens to account for non-redemption of properties that have
high lien-to-value ratios.236 An Ohio statute, for example, mandates that DTAN
borrowings must not exceed 90% of total lien face values.237 Local
governments can also limit borrowing by excluding liens with high lien-tovalue ratios from the total borrowed.238

231

See supra Part II.B.
See Roin, supra note 21, at 2002–04 (describing the transparency of the cost of debt).
233 See supra text accompanying notes 215–18.
234 See supra I.C.3.
235 This activity projection can then be used to estimate the expected amount of interest and penalties that
will accrue and actually be collected.
236 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.082(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009).
237 Id.
238 See supra I.C.3.
232

MARCHIONY PROOFS1

2012]

10/31/2012 8:02 AM

MAKING DEBT PAY

253

Government servicing and DTANS are not feasible options in all
jurisdictions because some governments lack adequate infrastructure. As the
following section asserts, the DTAN funding mechanism can and should be
implemented alongside a lien servicing strategy—other than tax lien sales—
that maximizes benefits and minimizes aggregate social costs.
B. Enhancing Outcomes in Diminished Capacity Jurisdictions
Not all municipalities will be able to issue DTANs and service their tax
lien digests because many local governments do not have the infrastructure and
capacity to do both. Municipalities vary in size and funding levels; therefore,
some may not have room in their budgets both to provide necessary services
and hire staff to service a delinquent tax digest. This lack of capacity is what
sometimes drives the sale of tax liens.239 Jurisdictions that currently use tax
lien sales will likely lack this ability, at least in the beginning of DTAN
implementation, because they currently rely on another party for lien servicing.
Such jurisdictions should consider the viability of creating a state- or
regional-level servicer or using contracts to control the activity of private
servicers and to simplify the calculus for measuring cost. This section shows
that both options retain government ownership and control over tax liens,
similar to that of a government that services the liens itself. They also enable
the government to better ensure accountability, adequate revenue returns, and
use of sound policy decisions that represent public interests.
The first option is a consolidated lien servicing effort that allows the local
government to transfer responsibility for tax servicing to another level of
government that is better equipped to handle it, such as a county or state
government entity or a regional entity.240 A key principle of local government
financing is that services should be provided at as local a level of government
as possible, but only to the degree that doing so would allow effective service
provision.241 If services cannot be provided competently at a particular level of
government, they should be provided at a different level of government that
can. Some jurisdictions have already recognized and acted upon an awareness
of capacity challenges. For example, Michigan shifts the responsibility for tax

239

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See Bahl, supra note 131, at 81.
241 John L. Mikesell, Developing Options for the Administration of Local Taxes: An International Review,
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 2007, at 41, 48.
240
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collection from the local government to the county,242 and all tax delinquent
properties in Arkansas revert to the state, which then may sell them.243
Additionally, consolidated tax lien servicing may produce economies of
scale and collections that are more efficient. For the same reason,
“consolidated service districts” have become common means for providing
public services, such as hospitals and parks, because they enable service
provision at lower costs.244 Although use of consolidated servicing can result
in less local control, a consolidated government entity would likely be more
responsive to public interests than would a private servicer that is only
responsive to its own profit incentives.245
Another alternative is the use of contractual or statutory246 controls, or a
combination of the two. If property tax servicing cannot be competently
provided by a government entity, public officials have a responsibility to
ensure that they are serving taxpayers’ needs by minimizing costs and
maximizing benefits. The use of private parties to service delinquent tax
digests may be the most feasible way to enforce property tax obligations in
some jurisdictions.
Given the time-consuming and uncertain nature of lawmaking,247 it would
be more efficient to implement controls over servicers’ behavior through
contract. As discussed below, there are several areas where control over
contractors should be improved, and it could be difficult to pass so many
statutory changes. Contract-based controls also would provide greater legal
recourse than statutory controls because the government can set specific
conditions that allow it to cease performance.248 In contrast, statutory controls
can only be enforced through the courts. Contracts also would enable the
government to control a servicer’s behavior independent of the actions by a
legislature whose members are far removed from the interests of a particular
community. Further, contractual provisions would be less susceptible to
242

See CHAD FARRINGTON, COLUMBIA MGMT., LOCAL MUNICIPAL CREDIT QUALITY DISSECTED 3 (2011).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-101(a), (c) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
244 See Bahl, supra note 131, at 81.
245 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
246 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 2C(c)(1) (West 2009) (establishing factors considered when
deciding whom to sell tax liens to, including “qualifications and experience” and having a “regular place of
business” in the jurisdiction).
247 ANN BOWMAN & RICHARD KEARNEY, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 129–33, 143 (8th ed. 2011)
(describing “multiple opportunities for delay and obstruction” in the legislative process).
248 See Roin, supra note 21, at 2006 (describing opportunities to minimize risk in contracts for privatized
services).
243
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change by a third party, such as a state legislature, so long as they comply with
state law.
By using contracted lien servicing rather than tax lien sales, the government
would control the foreclosure process.249 Contractors would not have the right
to initiate foreclosure unless specifically authorized through an agreement.
Consequently, the government alone would decide the types of properties that
should be incorporated into the redevelopment efforts of land banks or other
entities; it also would determine the types of taxpayers who should have their
tax obligations mitigated. This control would help minimize aggregate social
costs and better enable a consistently applied property tax enforcement strategy
to encourage taxpayer compliance. In addition, the use of contracted servicing
would enable governments to strategically structure relationships to their
benefit and ensure certain outcomes are achieved.250 Governments that use
contracted servicing also can enhance accountability by specifying terms,
penalties, and oversight in the agreement.251
Contracts used for lien servicing should address several factors to
overcome some of the risks outlined in this Comment. First, the contracts
should include consequences to private servicers for undesirable outcomes of
their servicing efforts or non-compliance with contract terms. The government
should ensure that it is able to terminate an agreement for consumer rights
violations and constitutional due process violations.252 Such provisions would
provide greater assurance that taxpayer interests are protected. The contract
bidding process should also exclude parties who have been tax delinquent in
the past or have abandoned a property.
Second, local governments should consider a multi-year partnership with
fewer servicers. With a longer term arrangement, a government would be able
to maintain consistency in servicing procedures and outcome reporting. A
longer term agreement also creates an incentive for the servicer to address
public interests because that provider becomes known by the public, which
increases the government’s ability to monitor the provider’s activity from time
to time.253 Similarly, by having a relationship with the servicer, a government
249

See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 608 (2000).
251 Id.
252 See GUENTHER, supra note 74, at 3 (discussing the IRS’s ability to revoke contracts with servicers who
violate federal law or contract terms).
253 See Roin, supra note 21, at 2027 (stating that “[a] longer-term contract may be necessary to ensure that
the private actor has the incentive to do its part of the bargain in the way that most benefits the public”).
250
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may be able to convince a servicer to participate in community development
planning as a condition for future contracting work. Further, a long-term
contract may make the servicer work more efficiently in a particular
community, which could lead to increased collections.254 Servicers generally
are more effective when they understand the local real estate market and
related state and local laws.255
Additionally, servicing contracts should be written in a manner that ensures
high-efficiency collections and protects taxpayer interests. Governments
should consider structuring their bidding process such that only providers with
experience and success at tax lien servicing are selected.256 Although a more
efficient collection would generate less tax revenue due to lesser accruals of
interest and penalties, taxpayers and communities would benefit from quick
resolution of debts. Taxpayer protection would further improve if servicing
contracts required servicers to provide property owners with their name and
contact information so that property owners can make contact if needed.257
Taxpayers may also benefit from contracts that establish standards for conduct
between a servicer and a property owner.258
Lastly, at a minimum, local governments that conduct tax lien sales should
also incorporate regulatory controls as part of their sale process. Some
governments may not be able to implement DTANs without a state statute in
place that enables their use.259 Local governments should develop regulations
that target some of the same items that this Comment proposes be included in
contract terms to the degree possible without conflicting with state law.
CONCLUSION
The first priority for local governments is to maintain service provision in
the face of revenue shortfalls. This priority is sometimes well served in the
short term by tax lien sales. However, when the sales are instead used as part
of a long-term revenue strategy, the government has a responsibility to ensure
that the cost and impact of the practice is justified, just as it has regarding any

254
255
256
257
258
259
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Poindexter et al., supra note 39, at 190–91.
Id.
See GUENTHER, supra note 74, at 8.
See supra Part II.D.1.
See, e.g., GUENTHER, supra note 74, at 3.
For example, some short-term notes are exempt from debt limitations. Roin, supra note 21, at 1984–
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other privatized service or tax expenditure. This responsibility becomes even
stronger when the underlying strategy produces significant risks to public
interests.
This Comment argues that a rational financial analysis should accompany a
local government’s selection of a strategy for addressing property tax revenue
shortfalls, and that the widespread use of tax lien sales without such an
analysis is irresponsible and potentially costly. One of a local government’s
most important roles is to squeeze the most benefit it can from limited
resources and balance current and future revenue needs. However, local
governments appear to be rejecting a proactive approach to public finance in
favor of a reactive approach to quickly obtain access to funds.
The opacity and complexity of property tax lien sale costs impede public
accountability. This Comment argues that the practice creates several
additional unnecessary risks, including community externalities, reduced rates
of return on property taxes, and diminished consumer and constitutional
protections. These risks can have a serious impact on the fiscal health of the
municipality and taking such a gamble is imprudent. While methods other than
tax lien sales are not certain to reduce tax delinquency or provide a greater rate
of return, there are very good reasons to believe that they will. As a result,
local governments should consider exchanging tax lien sales for DTANs—and
at a minimum, they should institute additional controls over costs and
community outcomes of tax enforcement.
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